Post-Colonial Systems of Power

Eqbal Ahmad

This is the second in a series of three summary essays on State and development in post-colonial societies.

Third World countries share only a few, negative attributes—economic underdevelopment, dependence on a foreign metropolis, an undernourished, underemployed, poverty-stricken populace largely deprived of basic educational, housing and health services. Political life in all but a few countries is characterized by centralization of power, government by Westernized elites with extremely constricted or no exercise of popular power, an absence of functioning institutions which allow for even a modicum of governmental accountability to the public, and executive infringement upon human rights without recourse to an independent judiciary.

Within this general framework of underdevelopment, unequal distribution and undemocratic politics there is a wide range of differences among the Third World countries. There exists but a negligible body of literature which attempts to identify and explain the contrasting developments. The focus of comparative research on the Third World has been on similarities rather than differences. Theoretical formulations compel emphasis on uniformities in the patterns of development while short-circuiting empirical evidence of significant differences between seemingly comparable States (e.g., Nasserite Egypt-Iraq; Tanzania-Uganda-Kenya; India-Pakistan-Sri Lanka) and socioeconomic formations (petite bourgeoisie, comprador bourgeoisie, the new middle class, the military-bureaucratic elite, etc.).

This has been true of the liberal "modernization" literature as well as the more recent and less numerous "Marxist" writings. Thus, the "dependency" theory, which made an important beginning toward the study of neocolonial relations, has been applied so generally and mechanistically that important distinctions have been blurred between various forms and levels of dependency and their effects on the development of given societies. Similarly, in recent years there has been a welcome surge of interest in the nature of State in post-colonial societies. But, so far, the literature on this subject remains too broad, abstract and detached from

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reality to be very meaningful. The first set of formulations on the post-colonial State—for example, by Franz Fanon, Roger Murray, and Hamza Alavi[1]—were remarkable for their empirical grounding and intellectual rigor. Unfortunately, subsequent literature on the subject has done little justice to these seminal attempts. Formulations about Third World States under the controlling interest of the petite bourgeoisie and the imperial metropolis, about the peripheral State being an "economic" and "political reproduction institution" are often so rarified and fragmented as to have little value as theory and less as a framework for analyzing specific situations and trends.

The following essay summarizes some of the general conclusions of a larger, unfinished work on "Development and the State in Dependent Societies." A critical survey of contemporary literature on Third World politics is beyond the scope of this essay. Here, it is relevant only to state that I avoid seeking a unifying theory of causation and linear conceptions of political development. My approach is eclectic. It owes a special intellectual debt to Antonio Gramsci's concepts of "hegemony," "relation of forces," and "dual perspectives" in the "analysis of situations."[2] Its aim is to identify and understand the varieties no less than the uniformities of developments in the Third World. As such, while regarding the interplay of imperialism and class struggle as the fundamental and decisive reality in the modern history and contemporary life of Third World peoples, it acknowledges the importance of historical experience, culture, morality and ideology in defining the specificity and autonomy of politics.

On an empirical basis, taking into account their historical antecedents, formal-legal status, ideological preferences, economic policies, conduct of politics, and international links, the majority of Third World States can be divided into the following systems of power:

1. The Elective-Parliamentary System (e.g., India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Jamaica, Singapore);
2. The Ascriptive-Palace System (e.g., Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait);
3. The Dynastic-Oligarchic System (e.g., Nicaragua under Somoza, Haiti, Paraguay);

1. Franz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris: François Maspéro, 1961); Roger Murray, "Second Thoughts on Ghana," *New Left Review* (1967:42); Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies." *New Left Review* (1972:74).

2. See Quentin Hoare, Dennis Nowell Smith, *Selections From The Prison Notebooks* (London and New York: Lawrence and Wishard International Publishers, 1971).

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4. The Pragmatic-Authoritarian System (e.g., Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tunisia, Zambia, Cameroun, Egypt under Sadat);

5. The Radical-Nationalist System (e.g., Algeria, Tanzania, Mexico, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Indonesia under Sukarno);

6. The Marxist-Socialist System (Cuba, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissao, Vietnam);

7. The Neo-Fascist System (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Iran under the Shah, Zaire).

A few clarifications: first, this classification is not the only one possible; using different criteria one may group the States quite differently. Its purpose is limited: to draw attention to the varieties of politics in the Third World, and to establish a framework for comparison in order to better understand the process of change, including sudden shifts from one system toward another. Second, taken together the seven categories are not comprehensive. There are States—Burma and Ethiopia come to mind—which at a given time may not fit any of the descriptions.

Third, the Third World is so replete with mixed political systems and States in flux as to defy rigorous typologies. For example, under Sukarno, Indonesia was formally an elective system and, unlike most Radical-Nationalist countries which are governed by single parties, it had multiple political parties. Yet, for its other dominant features I have regarded it as belonging in the Radical-Nationalist category. Senegal has a few characteristics of the Radical-Nationalist and not-a-few of the Traditional-Ascriptive system; I have placed it in the Pragmatic-Authoritarian mode. Egypt and Tunisia, which were (under Nasser and during a decade of planned development by Tunisian Minister for Planning Ahmed Ben Salah) leading members of the Radical-Nationalist mode, have moved rightward to join the Pragmatic-Authoritarian category. Since its founding by Colonel Reza Khan in 1924, the Pahlavi regime in Iran was, like those of Somoza, Batista and Trujillo in Latin America, a Dynastic-Oligarchic one until the mid-1960s when Western, primarily U.S., strategic interests and augmented income from oil began its full transformation into the Neo-Fascist mode. For two decades Pakistan has been swinging dramatically back and forth between democracy and dictatorship. This typology, then, is a methodological device to help understand these circular no less than linear developments. Perhaps "modes of power" might better suggest their tentative, changing character than does the more conventional word "system."

Lastly, of the seven systems only one—the Marxist-Socialist—represents a total break from the colonial State, and its replacement by a new and different state system. From Cuba to Vietnam, there is a wide range of important differences in the manner in which the new apparatus of

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statehood has been (and is being) created in these countries—their actual and potential linkages with the masses, the extent to which they envisage meaningful exercise of popular power and public accountability, and the manner in which the governments are run. Comparative analysis of these countries is crucial to an understanding of the promises and pitfalls of Marxist-Socialist development in post-colonial societies.

THE ELECTIVE-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

The Parliamentary system, the most dominant form on the morrow of decolonization, has stabilized in a few countries after yielding in most others to Radical-Nationalist (e.g., Egypt–1952; Syria–1954; Pakistan–1958) or Neo-Fascist (Iran–1953, Brazil–1964; Indonesia–1965, Chile–1973). The list of survivors, led by India, suggests that among the major factors contributing to the success of multi-party democracy in the Third World are: heterogeneity (ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity), the existence of a sizeable national bourgeoisie relatively independent of the State and exercising some control over the productive sector of the modern economy, a development policy which allows for the growth of a production-prone indigenous capitalist class, and limited penetration of U.S. economic and strategic interests.

Human rights violations occur because special security laws authorize limited but arbitrary power which the government often misuses. Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of the emergency was an extreme case of misuse. More commonly, a relatively independent judiciary, a free press and parliamentary debates ensure a degree of *procedural freedoms*—of speech and association, from arbitrary incarceration and systematic torture—not known in the other systems of power. The margin of *substantive freedoms*—from hunger and dispossession, illiteracy and vagrancy, etc.—tend to be extremely narrow under this system. Yet it enjoys a measure of legitimacy because periodic elections under universal suffrage give a promise of the accountability of the government to the electorate and also help maintain and enlarge a political class which links the civil society with political power, and because the existence of a relatively independent judiciary invests the system with a certain assumption of being rational and reformable. Above all, the system appears susceptible to popular demands and amenable to organized politics. As discussed later in this essay, the democratic polity is replaced by a military, frequently Neo-Fascist government precisely at the time when organized popular interests begin to gain ascendance through the electoral process.

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THE ASCRIPTIVE-PALACE SYSTEM

The Palace system of power, the oldest extant form in the Third World today, is also receding—a traditional victim of the social forces and tensions produced by "modernization." In some countries (Morocco, Jordan, Nepal) it survives by virtue of the fact that it still enjoys a measure of legitimacy (generally ascriptive) among large numbers of citizens, and an important segment of society views its continuation to be necessary for the maintenance of social balance and political order. In others (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi) the advantages of tradition have been vastly augmented by the sheer excess of sudden wealth among a relatively homogeneous and small population so that a certain affluence has accrued to nearly all citizens, and substantive freedoms have expanded considerably.

The rulers keep a tight grip on the reins of power by a combination of traditional and modern methods of bargaining, cooptation, shifting alliances, manipulation and coercion of allies as well as opponents. Violations of human rights are often serious and periodically widespread; legal norms are rarely enforced by independent judiciaries. But the political system's sense of legitimacy, its links with and respect for the norms of civil society, and an environment of political bargaining mitigate and limit the boundaries of repression, A significant increase in the government's coercive capabilities and a qualitative shift toward systematic violations of human rights occur when the system begins to lose its legitimacy. Such shifts normally mark the beginning of the system's end.

The economic and social policies of these States tend to be conservative, favoring large landholders, the private sector and foreign investment. Resistance to land reform and redistribution of wealth freezes the narrow margins of substantive freedoms (except, as already noted, in the smaller States inundated by oil income); paternalistic concern for the welfare of common people is generally expressed through symbolic gestures. In some cases (Yemen, Libya, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nepal) the rulers kept a tight lid on social change; but in all these instances except Nepal they have been unseated by an augmented, modernized corps of army officers. A notable feature of their demise: since the start of the decolonization process the Palace system of power has yielded to the Radical-Nationalist coup d'etat, not to the populist or socialist movement, nor to the Neo-Fascist junta.

THE DYNASTIC-OLIGARCHIC SYSTEM

The Oligarchic system, most commonly found in Latin America, is in many ways a precursor of the Neo-Fascist regimes of the 1960s and 1970s.

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As such, it shares many structural and behavioral traits with the latter. The primary differences between the older and newer right-wing tyrannies of the Third World lay in the organization and use of terror (being, at the start, less widespread, systematic, and anticipatory than in the Neo-Fascist regimes), resources (fewer), and importance to the hegemonious power (relatively less important). Symbiotically linked to metropolitan power and multinational capital, the system commands no legitimacy, and it eventually collapses under pressure from organized, popular, often revolutionary, movements.

THE PRAGMATIC-AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

The Pragmatic-Authoritarian system, most commonly found in Africa, has so far evinced a remarkable degree of durability. Of some forty-four founding fathers of the contemporary African States, only ten (Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Sekou Touré, Ahmadou Ahidjo, Habib Bourguiba, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Leopold Senghor, Kenneth Kaunda, Samore Machel, Agostino Neto, Luis Cabral) survive in power; of these, five lead countries in this category; while three (Machel, Neto, Cabral) have been independent only a few years. Only five (Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sir Milton Margai, William Tubman, Leon Mba, and Jomo Kenyatta) died in power; of these, three (Margai, Mba and Kenyatta) were from this category. (All the others were overthrown, but not by the electorate.) This highly personalized system of power enjoys a certain legitimacy and the support of significant sections of the population by virtue of the historical nationalist credentials of the leader. The support of rural notables and the urban bourgeoisie along with the role of the ruling party as an agent of communication and control reinforces the stability of the regime. The legitimacy of the regime begins to erode when it starts to rely on a managerial political elite and an expanding state bureaucracy for its links with the civil society, and the political party begins to neglect its participatory mechanisms and representational functions.

The economic policies of these States generally favor the private sector, encourage foreign investments, rely heavily on external technical and economic aid, and envisage a minimum of reforms in the traditional or colonial system of land tenure and labor relations. However, the State plays, on the patterns established by the colonial regime, some regulatory role especially in management-labor relations, and often provides an expanded and improved infrastructure of public services especially in health and education. Civil liberties are quite restricted; specially constituted courts often render relatively independent judiciaries irrelevant in politically motivated cases. Extreme violations of human rights (torture,

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imprisonment without trial) occur but remain limited both in intensity and in scope. Two noteworthy characteristics: these deeply pro-Western regimes tend to prefer strong political, economic and cultural ties with the ex-colonial metropolis rather than the United States. The strength of the armed forces remains circumscribed and, in comparison with civilians, military officers are assigned lower status in the official hierarchy. Often, a regime is protected from internal military threat by the dominant power; thus French troops are stationed in Senegal and the Ivory Coast, and British troops intervened in Tanzania and Uganda to suppress army mutineers in 1964. (In 1971, Idi Amin staged a coup d'etat after Milton Obote had followed Nyerere and made his much publicized "move to the left"; after this point, far from intervening in behalf of the civilian regime, the British are believed to have encouraged the coup by the Israeli-trained General Amin.)

THE RADICAL-NATIONALIST SYSTEM

Ascendant in the 1950s and through much of the 1960s, the Radical-Nationalist countries collectively dominated the organization of nonaligned nations. They claimed to represent an independent, non-capitalist, non-Marxist, yet socialist path to self-reliant development of Third World societies. Led by charismatic, "heroic" leaders (Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sukarno, Ahmed Ben Bella, etc.), aroused by anti-imperialist slogans, stirred by populist rhetoric, and enthused by promises of reform and renovation, these regimes were viewed—with fear in some quarters, admiration in others—as authentic expressions of Third World radicalism. But by 1970, they appeared to have lost their élan. In several countries Radical-Nationalist regimes began to drift rightward (e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan); in others they succumbed to military, frequently Neo-Fascist coups d'etat (e.g., Indonesia, Ghana, Uganda, Cambodia). In most countries, immobilism has become the primary characteristic of these erstwhile "mobilization" regimes. Only rarely, as in Algeria, do they show signs of revitalization.

The Radical-Nationalist is the broadest of the seven categories. It encompasses a wide variety of States with differing levels of achievements and stability. State-sponsored, rapid industrialization was a stated policy goal in Ghana, Guinea and Indonesia as it later was in Algeria and Iraq. Yet, Nkrumah's and Sukarno's premature grandiosity thwarted Ghanian and Indonesian development; if mineral extraction is excluded, Guinea's economy has also stagnated. On the other hand, in Algeria and Iraq planning and implementation have been more rational, and their rates

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of growth, aided by oil income, have been impressive; but the "turn-key" model of industrialization has generated little indigenous skill and employment. Only in resource-hungry Tanzania, when Julius Nyerere saw a contradiction between rapid industrial growth and the development goal of self-sufficiency, was the growth of the rural sector over the urban one emphasized. There are differences, too, in their antecedents. Some, like the regimes in Algeria, Tanzania, Guinea and Mexico, are directly descended from popular, national revolutions; the political parties in these countries have at least a history of organizing and representing the masses, and in many countries still play some role in linking the civil society with the State. Others, like those in Iraq, Syria, Somalia and Libya, were founded by military coups d'etat. While they enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy and popular acceptance, the political parties and trade unions sponsored by the regimes have had little success in developing into popular and participatory organizations.

The similarities among these States—in terms of their structure, ideology, and composition of the ruling elite—are more striking than their differences. They are governed by authoritarian, generally single-party regimes committed to rapid economic growth through centralized planning, redistribution of income through radical land reform, nationalization and state control of basic industries (and, in some cases, agricultural cooperatives), and to equity through the universalized distribution of such basic services as public health, education, transportation and housing. Ideologically eclectic, their leaders are nationalists in outlook and populist in rhetoric. While rejecting the notions of class domination and class struggle, they claim to be socialists and justify this claim on the basis of their economic program and their proclaimed commitment to the creation of independent, egalitarian, socialist republics.

With power centralized in the executive branch, and in the absence of independent judiciaries and assertive elected bodies, the margins of civil liberties tend to be quite narrow in these States. But the intensity and scope of their violations vary, and depend on the antecedents, ideological appeal and social-ethnic links of the leadership. For example, in Iraq where the majority Shi'i population and the largest non-Arab nationality (Kurds) are inadequately represented in the ruling Ba'th party, severe violations of human rights—including imprisonments without trial and frequent executions of dissidents—have occurred. On the other hand, in Algeria where the leadership has commanded some authority on the basis of its role in the war of national liberation, where regional and ethnic interests are better represented in the structures of power, and where a well-rooted, progressive opposition does not threaten the ruling elite, violations of human rights have been few, infrequent and progressively

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declining. On the whole, political repression in these States tends to be limited, and rarely becomes as massive or as systematic as in the Neo-Fascist countries. Popular pressure on these regimes builds slowly; in reaction the system either moves rightward in economic and social policy (Tunisia, Egypt) or else it yields to a militarist or Neo-Fascist takeover from within (Ghana, Uganda, Indonesia).

Further theoretical arguments on the causes of the failures of these regimes and their ultimately right-wing, repressive destiny appear in a later essay in this series which deals with the Neo-Fascist system of power. Here we note the peculiar contradictions which underlie this phenomenon. First, after acceding to power, these regimes command a certain legitimacy and the support and consensus of the governed. Their populist rhetoric, reformist program, developmental ambitions, advocacy of social justice, and anti-imperialist posture arouse expectations and elicit enthusiastic public response. Their popularity takes root as economic and social reforms and the nationalization of national resources promise to restore the nation's sovereignty and to expand the substantive freedoms of the common people. Their progressive and patriotic image is often confirmed by the manifest hostility of the imperialist metropolis. The idiom of politics under these regimes shifts to seek a mass constituency and, in the process of achieving it, radicalizes popular consciousness and the collective esteem of the toiling masses. Yet neither their class composition, ideology, nor their structural preferences equip these regimes to meet their mission. When they face pressure from the disillusioned masses they turn down the rightward, repressive road. Whether the turning is gradual or abrupt, in a conventional rightist or a Neo-Fascist direction, depends on a number of factors including the nature of the opposition and of the hegemonious external powers' strategic and economic interests in the country. In either case the distinction between the ostensibly benevolent and the crudely repressive Radical-Nationalist breaks down in the face of popular challenge.

Second, the rhetoric, claims and political stances of these regimes give them an appearance of being quite ideological. Yet, they invariably lack a coherent, consistent and functioning ideology. Conscientism, Nasserism, Bourguibism, Peronism, and Ba'thism are all ideologies remarkable for their lack of ideological content. They are amalgams of sentiments, generalized hopes and preferences, slogans and clichés borrowed—rather rented—from diverse sources but expressed uniquely, sometimes mystically, with an uncanny sense of opportunity. They go right to the heart, bypassing the head, with the power to mobilize without being able to guide or sustain. Hence, personalization of power and political spectacles rather than principles and values—the preambles upon which the ultimate

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authority of a political system rests—generally describe the shallowness of the system's legitimacy. Their ideological flabbiness, along with the shallow roots and managerial character of its ruling class, also define these regimes' propensity to shift abruptly and opportunistically in their international alignment (Egypt, Somalia, Sudan) and development strategies.

Third, a prominent characteristic of the Radical-Nationalist regimes is that they vastly expand the functions, size, and power of the inherited, colonial state apparatus. They are produced by and continue to rely heavily and progressively on an expanding bureaucracy and national security apparatus. In countries where mass political parties had existed and enjoyed some roots among the people, they have declined, conceding their functions to government agencies and bureaucrats. Where such a party did not exist and the Radical-Nationalist regimes were established by coups d'etat, government-sponsored parties have typically failed to take root. In either case, participatory and representative institutions have declined in these countries in direct proportion to the growth of oligarchic power and the state apparatus. Disengagement from mass politics is a necessary product of this process. In the absence of a consistent, coherent ideology the justification for the expansion of the state apparatus comes from the two interrelated notions of "development" and "national security." Together these two make up the ideologically rigged concept of modernization, which emphasizes a high rate of capital formation and growth, and the State as the primary development agency.

In a separate essay, we shall argue in some detail that the contemporary Third World State was a colonial creation, controlled by and conditioned to serve the imperial metropolis. As such, it was an extension of the metropolitan capitalist State, which developed in response to the needs of an ascendant commercial and industrial European bourgeoisie, and provided a framework of laws and institutions essential to the development of capitalist relations of production. As colonizing entities, these European States were the instruments of corporate expansion abroad—a process which served the double purpose not only of exploiting the colonized but also of exporting to the colonies the social and political tensions produced by the shift from feudalism to capitalism. The ability to export the tensions associated with social change made possible the growth of liberal democracies involving a subtle and complex balance between institutions of coercion and consensus. This perspective on the link between colonial expansion and the development of bourgeois democratic systems requires a renewed examination of the forces which led to the development of European Fascism, for it is not incidental that Fascism took hold in countries which underwent the process of industrialization while they

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were largely denied the colonial raw materials and markets, as well as the ability to export their tensions. (Germany and Italy are prime examples.) It also helps understand, at least partially, the roots of despotic (Socialist, Radical-Nationalist, and Neo-Fascist) development in the Third World.

Scholars have noted that the colonial State was centralized and endowed with a well-organized, modern military, police and administrative apparatus. The colonial powers gave only minor attention to the growth of representative institutions. Hence, it was from inception a modern despotism in that the quotient of coercion was much greater than that of consensus. More importantly, in the colonial State the process of modern state formation was reversed: far from being the creation of an ascendant national bourgeoisie, it was merely an extension of the metropolitan State. A native class of civil servants and soldiers—the state bourgeoisie of the Third World—was created to serve the colonial State. From the start, then, the creation of the modern State in the Third World involved the imposition of a well-developed military bureaucratic superstructure of power over an underdeveloped infrastructure of participation.

However, unlike most other analysts, we argue that the colonial State cannot properly be described as an "overdeveloped" one in the relative sense of the word. By and large, it maintained itself by limiting its interventions in society, by a network of alliances with the traditional ruling classes, and by exercising constraints in the expansion of the native sector of the state bureaucracy and security services. It was also characterized by the subordination of the newly created native state bourgeoisie to the higher-echelon members of the metropolis. In short, the colonial State maintained a sizeable traditional upper class whose legitimacy and power was emasculated through expropriation by and collaboration with colonialism, along with a subordinated state bourgeoisie created and sustained by it. After decolonization the former lacked the will and the capacity to subordinate the latter. Hence, the civilian political leadership tends to be overthrown or bypassed by the state sector when it (1) has outlived its usefulness in the consolidation of power following decolonization; (2) becomes an impediment to oligarchic growth; or (3) seeks reinforcement of popular institutions and the exercise of popular power. Only in exceptional Third World societies such as India, where an indigenous capitalism began to develop in the nineteenth century and expanded significantly between the two world wars, has a national bourgeoisie (that is, one outside of the state sector) developed that is capable of establishing its hegemony over, or at least becoming an equal partner with, the state bourgeoisie.

The power of the state bourgeoisie was derivative from the State; its expansion depended on the expansion of state power and functions.

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Hence, its vested interests and compulsions would be toward expanding the state machinery. Under colonial rule, this urge was subject to the control and the needs of the metropolis; the metropolis' needs required an efficient, despotic, but relatively limited and defined government. Decolonization involved a handing over of the state apparatus to the erstwhile subordinate state bourgeoisie, and brought with it the freedom to expand. After recovering from the initial shock of seeing this subordinate class take power and use strident nationalist rhetoric, the metropolitan powers, and particularly the United States, contributed heavily to the expansion of the State in post-colonial societies.

The ruling class which dominates the radical authoritarian regime has been described rather inaccurately as issuing from the petite bourgeoisie, for this description denotes a class accustomed to a modest middle position in an established social order. The liberal academic description of it as a new middle class is more suggestive of its roots as well as its disposition. It is a unique Third World phenomenon which owes its existence to colonialism and uneven development: a modern, educated managerial elite isolated from the productive process, alienated from its culture and, in the face of continued dependency on external know-how and capital, unable to expand into a productive national bourgeoisie. It is a class torn out of its original petite bourgeois and, to a lesser extent, bourgeois roots, and placed in a modern bureaucratic, national security setting. There it nourishes aspirations and attitudes which depend on continuing expansion of the sectors which require servicing, management and control. It is a ''power elite'' in the literal sense of the word, in the sense that its primary vocation is the exercise of power; it owes its very existence to the task of management. In a nationalist environment it discovers nationalization and state control of the economy as an effective way to expand its own size and power. Statism often provides an independent material base to this oligarchy and foreign development aid links this base to the metropolis. Hence, wherever the foreign capitalist sector is weak and the *servicing* bourgeoisie is not divided between the State and corporate bureaucracy, its quest for self-aggrandizement produces the self-proclaimed socialist regime. In those countries where imperial, particularly U.S., strategic hegemonic interests have been large and deep-rooted, it turns easily toward Neo-Fascism.

When separated from the legitimizing support of the ''heroic'' national leader or the original nationalist political class, the ruling state bourgeoisie of the radical authoritarian regime exercises no legitimacy. It lacks not only a coherent and functioning ideology, but also the history and the symbols capable of invoking the consent of a significant section of the masses. It exercises power without hegemony, deploys force without

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consent, dominates the State while remaining isolated from the civil society. The State in these societies undoubtedly exercises, as some Marxist scholars have argued, a certain autonomy—an autonomy born out of isolation from society. And it is an autonomy which necessarily involves the maintenance of an unequal relationship with an external metropolis. Such a State is not merely a subsidiary but a suspended State, inherently incapable of endogenous development.

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